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Abstract. Data describing the historical growth of human population global and regional 
(Western Europe, Eastern Europe, Asia, former USSR, Africa and Latin America) are 
analysed. Results are in harmony with the earlier analysis of the historical growth of the 
world population in the past 12,000 years and with a similar but limited study carried out 
over 50 years ago. This analysis is also in harmony with the study of the historical 
economic growth. Within the range of analysable data, there was no Malthusian stagnation. 
Takeoffs from stagnation to growth, postulated by the Unified Growth Theory never 
happened. There were no escapes from the Malthusian trap because there was no trap. This 
analysis and the earlier studies of the Gross Domestic Product lead to the conclusion that 
there were also no takeoffs in the income per capita distributions, claimed by the Unified 
Growth Theory. Consequently, the claimed in this theory differential timing in takeoffs 
never happened. Unified Growth Theory is contradicted yet again by the mathematical 
analysis of the same data, which were used, but never analysed, during the formulation of 
this theory. However, this study, as well as the earlier publications on the related topics, 
shows also that some fundamental postulates used in the economic and demographic 
research are repeatedly contradicted by the mathematical analysis of data. 
 
Introduction 
Historical economic growth can be studied using the Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP). However, to understand the time dependence of the income per capita 
(GDP/cap) it is necessary to understand not only the economic growth, expressed 
in terms of the GDP, but also the growth of human population. We have already 
analysed the GDP data (Nielsen, 2016a).  Now, we shall analyse the growth of 
human population using the same source of data (Maddison, 2010). The aim of all 
these studies is to investigate the validity of the Unified Growth Theory (Galor, 
2005a,  2011). 
Our earlier analysis (Nielsen, 2016a) demonstrated that the historical economic 
growth, regional and global, was following hyperbolic distributions. Analysis 
published over 50 years ago (von Foerster, Mora & Amiot, 1960) demonstrated 
that the growth of the world population was also hyperbolic during the AD era. The 
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follow-up analysis (Nielsen, 2016c) demonstrated that the growth of the world 
population was hyperbolic not only during the AD era but also during the BC era, 
for the total of around 12,000 years. This particular analysis identified two 
demographic transitions in the past growth of the population: between 500 BC and 
AD 500 and between AD 1200 and 1400. However, these transitions were of a 
different kind than transitions used routinely in demographic research. They were 
not transitions from stagnation to growth but from growth to growth, or more 
precisely, from hyperbolic growth to hyperbolic growth. The first transition was 
from a fast hyperbolic growth (as defined by the parameter k, explained below) 
during the BC era to a significantly slower hyperbolic growth during the AD era. 
During this transition, the size of human population reached a maximum around 
AD 1 and after reaching a minimum between AD 400 and 500 it resumed it slower 
hyperbolic growth during the AD era. However, the starting size of the population 
in AD 500 was significantly larger than in 10,000 BC and the slower hyperbolic 
growth increased rapidly to reach a large size of the population in only about 2000 
years. During this first demographic transition, the growth rate decreased from 
0.252% in 500 BC to 0.066% in AD 500. The second transition was hardly 
noticeable but it resulted in a change from a slow hyperbolic trajectory to slightly 
faster hyperbolic trajectory. During this transition, after a short delay in the growth 
of the population, the growth rate increased only marginally from 0.123% in AD 
1200 to 0.157% in AD 1400. Currently the growth of the world population 
experiences a third demographic transition to a yet unknown trajectory. 
 
Unified Growth Theory 
The latest and the most elaborate theory describing economic growth is the Unified 
Growth Theory (Galor, 2005a, 2011). It is not a theory, which is widely accepted 
by economist and used in their research. In fact, the opposite seems to be true. 
However, we are using this theory as an example for two reasons. First, it is a 
theory, which is firmly supported by traditional assumptions about the historical 
economic growth and about the historical growth of human population, 
assumptions, which are based on strongly questionable conjectures. Our primary 
aim here, as well as in our earlier publications (Nielsen, 2014, 2015a, 2016a, 
2016b, 2016c, 2016d, 2016e), is not just to test the validity of this theory or the 
validity of a similar Demographic Transition Theory (see Nielsen, 2016e and 
references therein) but to test the validity of the fundamental postulates used in 
economic and demographic research. Second, Unified Growth Theory appears to 
be the only theory where Maddison’s data (Maddison, 2001) were systematically 
used.  
In the last years of his life, Magnusson, the world-renown economist, published 
excellent data describing not only the economic growth as expressed by the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) but also the growth of human population, global, regional 
and national (Magnuson, 2001, 2010). These data are a treasure trove, which can 
be used in the economic and demographic research. In particular, they can be used 
to test the fundamental postulates supporting these two fields of research. Galor 
used the earlier compilation of these data (Magnuson, 2001) but any of these 
compilations can be used to test the fundamental postulates supporting economic 
and demographic research, and in particular to test the validity of the Unified 
Growth Theory.  
Unfortunately, Galor did not use Maddison’s data in the way they should be used 
in scientific research. He did not analyse data. He did not use these data to test the 
 3 
 
fundamental assumptions but to confirm them. Such a use of data might be 
tolerable in disciplines where doctrines are accepted by faith but not in science.  To 
this end, data were systematically manipulated by repeatedly quoting, for instance, 
some well-chosen and isolated figures. His theory and its fundamental postulates 
are also based on the habitually distorted and self-misleading presentations of data 
(Ashraf, 2009; Galor, 2005a, 2005b, 2007, 2008a, 2008b, 2008c, 2010, 2011, 
2012a, 2012b, 2012c; Galor and Moav, 2002; Snowdon & Galor, 2008). This 
approach to research was used to promote such scientifically-unsupported concepts 
as the concept of the three regimes of growth (Malthusian regime of stagnation, 
post-Malthusian regime and sustained-growth regime), the concept of sudden 
takeoffs from stagnation to growth, the concept of differential takeoffs and the 
concept of the great divergence. An example of such diagrams is shown in Figure 
1. (All diagrams are presented in the Appendix.)  
Hyperbolic distributions do not have to be distorted to be confusing. They are 
already sufficiently confusing and it is easy to make mistakes with their 
interpretations. Hyperbolic distributions have to be carefully and methodically 
analysed and fortunately their analysis becomes trivial when using the reciprocal 
values of data (Nielsen, 2014). Displays, such as presented in Figure 1, which is 
based on a figure presented by Galor (2005a, p. 181), are self-misleading and they 
inevitably lead to incorrect conclusions.  
The correct and accurate display of Maddison’s data (Maddison, 2001), precisely 
the same data as used but never scientifically analysed during the formulation of 
the Unified Growth Theory (Galor, 2005a, 2011), is presented in Figure 2. Analysis 
of these data reveals that they follow monotonically-increasing distributions, which 
are impossible to divide into distinctly-different components governed by 
distinctly-different mechanisms of growth (Nielsen, 2015a). 
Whether expressed by using the GDP or GDP/cap, the economic growth was slow 
over a long time and fast over a short time but it was monotonically increasing all 
the time. What appears as stagnation was a part of the monotonically-increasing 
distribution, and what appears as a sudden takeoff was the natural continuation of 
the same monotonically-increasing distribution.  
Attempts to determine the time of the perceived transition from the perceived slow 
to a fast growth are bound to be unsuccessful because there was no transition 
(Nielsen, 2014, 2015a). The growth of the GDP is described by hyperbolic 
distributions (Nielsen, 2016a) and the growth of the GDP/cap by the linearly-
modulated hyperbolic distributions (Nielsen, 2015a).  
We have already demonstrated that the Unified Growth Theory is contradicted by 
the GDP data for Western Europe, Eastern Europe, countries of former USSR, 
Asia, Africa and Latin America (Nielsen, 2016b, 2016d). We have also 
demonstrated that the Unified Growth Theory is contradicted by the data 
describing the growth of the world income per capita (Nielsen, 2015a). Our next 
step now it to investigate the properties of regional growth of income per capita 
(GDP/cap). To this end we have to analyse first regional population data 
(Maddison, 2010) but we shall also include the analysis of the world population 
data.  
One of the fundamental postulates of the Unified Growth Theory is the postulate of 
the existence of three regimes of growth governed by three distinctly different 
mechanisms: (1) the Malthusian regime of stagnation, (2) the post-Malthusian 
regime, and (3) the sustained-growth regime. This postulate applies not only to the 
 4 
 
growth of the GDP but also to the growth of human population because Galor 
discusses the growth of income per capita, (GDP/cap), which is made of two 
components: the growth of the GDP and the growth of the population. 
According to Galor (2005a, 2008a, 2011, 2012a), Malthusian regime of stagnation 
was between 100,000 BC and AD 1750 for developed regions and between 
100,000 BC and AD 1900 for less-developed regions. The claimed starting time 
appears to be based entirely on conjecture because Maddison’s data are terminated 
at AD 1 and even they contain significant gaps below AD 1500. The post-
Malthusian regime was allegedly between AD 1750 and 1850 for developed 
regions and from 1900 for less-developed regions. The sustained-growth regime 
was supposed to have commenced around 1850 for developed regions. 
Unified Growth Theory (Galor, 2005a, 2008a, 2011, 2012a) can be tested in many 
ways but the easiest way to test it is to look for the dramatic takeoffs from 
stagnation to growth. These takeoffs are described as a “remarkable” or “stunning” 
escape from the Malthusian trap (Galor, 2005a, pp. 177, 220). It is a signature, 
which cannot be missed.  
This change in the pattern of growth is described as “the sudden take-off from 
stagnation to growth” (Galor, 2005a, pp. 177, 220, 277) or as a “sudden spurt” 
(Galor, 2005a, 177, 220). According to Galor, for developed regions, the end of the 
Malthusian regime of stagnation coincides with the Industrial Revolution. “The 
take-off of developed regions from the Malthusian Regime was associated with the 
Industrial Revolution” (Galor, 2005a, p. 185). Indeed, the Industrial Revolution is 
considered to have been “the prime engine of economic growth” (Galor, 2005a, p. 
212).  
This signature is characterised by three features: (1) it should be a prominent 
change in the pattern of growth, (2) it should be a transition from stagnation to 
growth and (3) it should occur at the time predicted by the theory. For developed 
regions, the postulated takeoffs should occur around AD 1750, or around the time 
of the Industrial Revolution, 1760-1840 (Floud & McCloskey, 1994). For less-
developed regions, they should occur around 1900. The added advantage of using 
this simple test is that there are no significant gaps in the data around the time of 
the postulated takeoffs and consequently the stagnation and the expected prominent 
transitions from stagnation to growth should be easily identifiable.  
A transition from growth to growth is not a signature of the postulated takeoff from 
stagnation to growth. Thus, for instance, a transition from hyperbolic growth to 
another hyperbolic growth or to some other steadily-increasing trajectory is not a 
signature of the sudden takeoff from stagnation to growth. Likewise, a transition at 
a distinctly different time is not a confirmation of the theoretical expectations.  
The takeoffs claimed by Galor are in the income per capita (GDP/cap), which 
means that there should be takeoffs from stagnation to growth in at least one of 
these components (in the GDP or in the population or in both of them) at a specific 
time (Galor, 2008a, 2012a). We have already demonstrated that there were no 
takeoffs in the growth of the GDP (Nielsen, 2016d). Consequently, to confirm the 
Unified Growth Theory we would have to show not only that there were takeoffs 
from stagnation to growth in the growth of the population but also that these 
takeoffs occurred at the specific time claimed by Galor (2008a, 2012a), around AD 
1750 for developed regions (Western Europe, Eastern Europe and the former 
USSR) and at around AD 1900 for less developed regions (Asia, Africa and Latin 
America). We shall now demonstrate that there were no such takeoffs. Thus we 
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shall demonstrate implicitly that there were no takeoffs in the income per capita, 
which means that Galor’s postulate of the differential timing in takeoffs is also 
contradicted by data, because we cannot have differential timing in takeoffs 
without takeoffs. 
 
Essentials of the mathematical analysis 
Hyperbolic distribution describing growth is represented by a reciprocal of a linear 
function:  
1
( )S t
a kt
,        (1) 
where ( )S t  is the size of the growing entity, in our case the population, while a and 
k are positive constants.  
As pointed out earlier (Nielsen, 2014), hyperbolic distributions are confusing 
because they create an illusion of being made of two components, slow and fast, 
with perhaps even a third component in the middle. It is easy to make a mistake 
with their interpretations. Fortunately, these distributions are easy to analyse by 
using the reciprocal values of data, 1/ ( )S t  : 
1
( )
a kt
S t
.        (2) 
In this representation, data follow a decreasing straight line, which obviously 
cannot be divided into three distinctly different components. 
Reciprocal values help in an easy and generally unique identification of hyperbolic 
growth. Apart from serving as an alternative way to analyse data, reciprocal values 
allow also for the investigation of even small deviations from hyperbolic 
distributions because deviations from a straight line can be easily noticed.  
The illusion of different components also disappears when using semilogarithmic 
scales of reference. Both types of displays help in an easy identification of 
disagreements between data and fitted curves for small values of data and we shall 
use both of these displays.  
 
Growth of the world population 
Results of mathematical analysis of the world economic growth are presented in 
Figures 3 and 4. Reciprocal values of historical data identify uniquely hyperbolic 
distribution between AD 1000 and around 1950 because the reciprocal data follow 
a decreasing straight line. From around 1950, the growth of the world population 
started to be diverted to a slower trajectory but first it was slightly boosted. The 
boosting was small (it is hardly noticeable in the displayed diagrams) and it did not 
last long.  
Hyperbolic fit to the world population data (Maddison, 2010) is shown in Figure 4. 
The fit is remarkably good. The point at AD 1 is 75% away from the fitted curve. 
This discrepancy is in perfect agreement with the analysis of the growth of the 
world population over the past 12,000 years (Nielsen, 2016c), which demonstrated 
a maximum around that year.  
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Parameters describing hyperbolic trajectory fitting the data between AD 1000 and 
1950 are:  07.73 19 0a and  33.765 10k . Its singularity is at 2056t  . 
However, from around 1950, the growth of the world population started to be 
diverted to a slower trajectory bypassing the singularity by a safe margin of 106 
years. This diversion was first manifested in a minor and short-lasting boosting of 
the growth of the world population. 
The data are in disagreement with the Unified Growth Theory (2005a, 2011). 
Industrial Revolution had no impact on the growth trajectory. There were also no 
takeoffs from stagnation to growth around AD 1750 for developed regions and 
around AD 1900 for less-developed regions because there was no stagnation and 
because hyperbolic growth continued undisturbed. If there were such takeoffs in 
the respective regions, we would have expected to see clear distortions of the 
growth trajectory, but the trajectory was remarkably stable during these alleged but 
non-existent takeoffs. Unified Growth Theory is yet again demonstrably 
contradicted by data.  
With the absence of the takeoffs in the growth of the population and with the 
earlier demonstrated absence of the takeoffs in the growth of the GDP (Nielsen, 
2016d), this analysis shows that there were no takeoffs in the income per capita 
(GDP/cap) distribution. Unified Growth Theory (Galor, 2005a, 2011) is 
contradicted by data, which were used but never analysed during the formulation of 
this theory. 
 
Western Europe 
Growth of the population in Western Europe is shown in Figures 5 and 6. Western 
Europe is represented by the total of 30 countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, 
United Kingdom, Greece, Portugal, Spain and by 14 small, but unspecified 
countries. Ireland is missing in this list because it was included only from 1921.  
The straight line fitting the reciprocal values of data, shown in Figure 5, identifies 
uniquely hyperbolic distribution between AD 1000 and around 1915. Parameters 
describing the hyperbolic growth in Western Europe are:  17.54 12 0a and
23.749 10k . The point of singularity is at 2012t  . From around 1915, the 
growth of the population in Western Europe started to be diverted to a slower, but 
still fast-increasing, trajectory bypassing the singularity by safe margin of 97 years. 
The size of the population in AD 1 is 89% higher than the fitted hyperbolic 
distribution. This discrepancy is probably reflecting a maximum in the growth of 
the world population around that year (Nielsen, 2016c). 
Figures 5 and 6 show that hyperbolic growth between AD 1000 and 1915 remained 
undisturbed. Industrial Revolution had absolutely no impact on changing the 
hyperbolic growth trajectory in the region where the effects of this revolution 
should be most prominent. There was no takeoff from stagnation to growth at the 
postulated time (Galor, 2008a, 2012a) because there was no stagnation but a 
hyperbolic growth. There was even no transition to a faster hyperbolic trajectory.  
With the absence of the takeoff in the growth of the population in Western Europe 
and with the earlier demonstrated absence of the takeoff in the growth of the GDP 
(Nielsen, 2016d), this analysis shows that there was no takeoff in the income per 
capita (GDP/cap) distribution. Unified Growth Theory (Galor, 2005a, 2011) is 
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contradicted by data, which were used but never analysed during the formulation of 
this theory. 
 
Eastern Europe 
Results of analysis of the growth of population in Eastern Europe are summarized 
in Figures 7 and 8. Reciprocal values of data shown in Figure 7 identify uniquely 
hyperbolic distribution between AD 1000 and around 1935. From that year, the 
growth of population started to be diverted to a slower trajectory.  
Hyperbolic parameters are: 23.05 15 0a and 11.525 10k . The point of 
singularity is at 2003t . Figures 7 and 8 demonstrate that the Industrial 
Revolution had no impact on the trajectory of the growth of the population in 
Eastern Europe and that there was no takeoff from stagnation to growth at a 
postulated time (Galor, 2008a, 2012a) because there was no stagnation but 
hyperbolic growth. There was even no takeoff to a faster hyperbolic growth. The 
size of the population at AD 1 was 45% higher than the calculated curve reflecting 
probably the maximum in the growth of the world population around that year 
(Nielsen, 2016c). 
With the absence of the takeoff in the growth of the population in Eastern Europe 
and with the earlier demonstrated absence of the takeoff in the growth of the GDP 
(Nielsen, 2016d), this analysis shows that there was no takeoff in the income per 
capita (GDP/cap) distribution. Unified Growth Theory (Galor, 2005a, 2011) is 
contradicted by data, which were used but never analysed during the formulation of 
this theory. 
 
Former USSR 
The analysis of data for the countries of the former USSR is presented in Figures 9 
and 10. Reciprocal values shown in Figure 9 identify uniquely hyperbolic 
distribution between AD 1 and around 1920. The hyperbolic fit to the data is 
between AD 1 and 1870. Parameters fitting the data are:  22.61 18 0a and 
11.333 10k . The singularity is at 1965t  From around 1920, the growth of 
the population in the former USSR started to be diverted to a slower trajectory, 
bypassing the singularity by around 45 years.  
Figures 9 and 10 show that the Industrial Revolution had no impact on shaping the 
growth of human population in the countries of the former USSR. There was also 
no takeoff from stagnation to growth around the postulated time Galor (2008a, 
2012a) or around any other time because the growth was not stagnant but 
hyperbolic. There was even no transition to a faster hyperbolic trajectory but there 
was a transition to a slower, non-hyperbolic growth around 1920.  
With the absence of the takeoff in the growth of the population in the countries of 
the former USSR and with the earlier demonstrated absence of the takeoff in the 
growth of the GDP (Nielsen, 2016d), this analysis shows that there was no takeoff 
in the income per capita (GDP/cap) distribution. Unified Growth Theory (Galor, 
2005a, 2011) is contradicted by data, which were used but never analysed during 
the formulation of this theory. 
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Asia 
Analysis of the growth of human population in Asia (including Japan) is 
summarised in Figures 11 and 12. Reciprocal values presented in Figure 11 
identify uniquely hyperbolic distribution between AD 1000 and around 1920. The 
parameters describing this distribution are:  11.06 18 0a and 34.999 10k . 
The point of singularity is at 2135t .  
Asia is made primarily of less-developed countries (BBC, 2014; Pereira, 2011) and 
consequently, according to Galor (2008a, 2012a), the growth of human population 
in Asia should have been characterised by stagnation until around 1900, the year 
marking the alleged stunning escape from Malthusian trap, the escape manifested 
by the postulated dramatic takeoff. (The population of Japan before AD 1900 was 
on average less than 4% of the total population of Asia.) The data and their analysis 
show that there was no stagnation, at least from AD 1000 and no expected takeoff.   
The data reveal a steadily increasing hyperbolic growth until around 1920. From 
around that year the growth of human population was diverted to a faster trajectory. 
This boosting can be seen clearly in Figures 11 and 12 and it occurred close to the 
time of the postulated takeoff from stagnation to growth. However, it was not a 
transition from stagnation to growth but from hyperbolic growth to a slightly faster 
trajectory of a different kind. It is, therefore, not the takeoff postulated by Galor. 
Furthermore, it was only a temporary boosting, which is now returning to the 
original hyperbolic trajectory and, as indicated by the reciprocal values of data, this 
new growth is likely to be slower than the original trajectory.  
With the absence of the postulated takeoff in the growth of the population in Asia 
and with the earlier demonstrated absence of the takeoff in the growth of the GDP 
(Nielsen, 2016d), this analysis shows that there was no takeoff in the income per 
capita (GDP/cap) distribution. Unified Growth Theory (Galor, 2005a, 2011) is 
contradicted by data, which were used but never analysed during the formulation of 
this theory. 
 
Africa 
Results of analysis of the growth of human population in the 57 African countries 
are presented in Figures 13 and 14. Reciprocal values identify uniquely two 
hyperbolic trajectories: AD 1-1840 and AD 1840-1980. At first it was a slow 
hyperbolic growth characterised by parameters 15.79 14 0a and 
22.473 10k and by the singularity at 2343t .  Then, around 1840, this slow 
hyperbolic growth was replaced by a significantly faster hyperbolic growth 
characterised by parameters  21.57 11 0a and 27.834 10k and by the 
singularity at 2006t . Defined by the parameter k, this new growth was 3.2 times 
faster than the earlier hyperbolic growth. From around 1980, this fast hyperbolic 
growth was diverted to a slower, non-hyperbolic trajectory, bypassing singularity 
by 26 years. 
Africa is also made of less-developed countries (BBC, 2014; Pereira, 2011) so 
according to Galor (2008a, 2012a) it should have experienced stagnation until 
around 1900 followed by a clear takeoff around that year. These expectations are 
contradicted by data because (1) the growth of population was not stagnant but 
hyperbolic until around 1980 and (2) because there was no takeoff from stagnation 
to growth around 1900 or around any other time. In fact around that time 
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hyperbolic growth continued unaffected in contradiction of the wished-for 
interpretations.    
The acceleration in the growth of human population in Africa occurred around 
1840, but it was not a transition from stagnation to growth but from growth to 
growth. Even more precisely, it was a transition from the hyperbolic growth to 
another hyperbolic growth.  
This acceleration can be probably explained by noticing that it appears to coincide 
with the intensified colonisation of Africa (Duignan & Gunn, 1973; McKay, Hill, 
Buckler, Ebrey, Beck, Crowston, & Wiesner-Hanks, 2012; Pakenham, 1992). The 
fast growth of the population after 1840 was not reflecting the rapidly improving 
living conditions of African population brought about by the beneficial changes 
caused by the Industrial Revolution but by the rapidly increasing wealth of new 
settlers and their countries of origin at the expense of the deplorable living 
conditions of the native populations because as shown elsewhere (Nielsen, 2013) 
growth rate of human population is directly proportional to the level of deprivation. 
With the absence of the takeoff in the growth of the population in Africa and with 
the earlier demonstrated absence of the takeoff in the growth of the GDP (Nielsen, 
2016d), this analysis shows that there was no takeoff in the income per capita 
(GDP/cap) distribution. Unified Growth Theory (Galor, 2005a, 2011) is 
contradicted by data, which were used but never analysed during the formulation of 
this theory. 
 
Latin America 
Results of analysis of population growth in Latin America are presented in Figures 
15 and 16. Data for Latin America are difficult to analyse because there was a 
significant decline in the growth of the population between AD 1500 and 1600 but 
they also appear to follow two distinctly different hyperbolic trajectories, which 
can be easily identified using the reciprocal values of data (see Figure 15). 
However, the identification of the first trajectory is not as clear as for Africa. The 
identification of the second hyperbolic trajectory is more convincing. Tentative 
conclusion is that the growth of population in Latin America was following a slow 
hyperbolic distribution between AD 1 and 1500 and a fast hyperbolic distribution 
between AD 1600 and around 1900.  
The tentatively assigned slow hyperbolic growth between AD 1 and 1500 is 
characterised by parameters 21.765 10a and 28.242 10k . Its singularity is 
at 2142t .  The better determined fast hyperbolic growth between AD 1600 and 
1900 is characterised by parameters 26.56 11 0a and 13.371 10k . Its 
singularity is at 1947t . Defined by the parameter k, this growth was 4.1 times 
faster than the earlier hyperbolic growth. From around 1900, this fast hyperbolic 
growth started to be diverted to a slower trajectory bypassing the singularity by 47 
years. The transition from the earlier apparent hyperbolic growth to a new and 
rapid hyperbolic growth, which occurred between around AD 1500 and 1600 
appears to coincide with the commencement of the Spanish conquest (Bethell, 
1984). 
Latin America is also made of less-developed countries (BBC, 2014; Pereira, 2011) 
so again, according to Galor (2008a, 2012a), the growth of human population in 
this regions should have been stagnant until around 1900 and fast-increasing from 
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around that year. This pattern of growth is contradicted by data. The data show a 
diametrically different pattern: (1) there is no convincing evidence of the existence 
of stagnation over the entire range of time between AD 1 and 1900 but there is a 
sufficiently convincing evidence of the hyperbolic growth particularly between AD 
1600 and 1900; (2) there was no takeoff from stagnation to growth at any time; and 
(3) at the time of the postulated takeoff in 1900 the growth of the population started 
to be diverted to a slower trajectory. The wished-for takeoff is replaced by a slower 
growth. However, even if we had a takeoff around that time it would have been a 
takeoff of a different kind, not a takeoff from stagnation to growth as required by 
the Unified Growth Theory (Galor, 2005a, 2011) but a takeoff from growth to 
growth.  
With the absence of the takeoff in the growth of the population in Latin America 
and with the earlier demonstrated absence of the takeoff in the growth of the GDP 
(Nielsen, 2016d), this analysis shows that there was no takeoff in the income per 
capita (GDP/cap) distribution. Unified Growth Theory (Galor, 2005a, 2011) is 
contradicted by data, which were used but never analysed during the formulation of 
this theory. 
 
Summary and conclusions 
Results of mathematical analysis of the historical growth of human population are 
summarised in Table 1. The listed parameters a and k are for the fitted hyperbolic 
distributions. 
 
Table 1. Summary of the mathematical analysis or the historical growth of 
population 
Region/Countries a k Hyperbolic 
Range 
Singul
arity 
Proxi
mity 
Take
off 
World 07.739 10  33.765 10  
1000 – 1950 2056 106 X 
Western Europe 17.542 10  23.749 10  
1000 – 1915 2012 97 X 
Eastern Europe 23.055 10  11.525 10  
1000 – 1935 2003 68 X 
Former USSR 22.618 10  11.333 10  
1 – 1920 1965 45 X 
Asia 11.068 10  34.999 10  
1000 – 1920 2135 215 X 
Africa 
 
15.794 10  
21.571 10  
22.473 10  
27.834 10  
1 – 1840 
1840 – 1980  
2343 
2006 
 
26 
 
X          
Latin America 
 
21.765 10  
26.561 10  
28.242 10  
13.371 10  
1 – 1500 
1600 – 1900  
2142 
1947 
 
47 
 
X 
Notes: a and k – Hyperbolic growth parameters [see eqn (1)]. Hyperbolic Range - The empirically-
confirmed range of time when the growth of population can be described using hyperbolic 
distributions. Singularity - The time of the escape to infinity for a given hyperbolic distribution. 
Proximity - Proximity (in years) of singularity at the time when the economic growth departed from 
the hyperbolic growth to a new trajectory. X - No takeoff. The takeoff from stagnation to growth 
claimed by the Unified Growth Theory (Galor, 2005a, 2008a, 2011, 2012a) did not happen.  
 
This analysis demonstrates that the natural tendency for the historical growth of 
human population was to increase hyperbolically. In general, there is a remarkably 
good agreement between the data and the calculated hyperbolic distributions. 
Unlike the more familiar exponential distributions, which are easier to understand 
because they show more readily a gradually increasing growth, hyperbolic 
distributions appear to be made of two or maybe even three components: a slow 
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component, a fast component and perhaps even a transition component located 
between the apparent slow and fast components. The illusion is so strong that even 
the most experienced researchers can be deceived particularly if they have no 
access to good sets of data, which was in the past. Now, however, excellent data 
are available (Maddison, 2001, 2010) and we can use them to check the earlier 
interpretations of economic growth and of the growth of human population.   
The postulate of the existence of the epoch of Malthusian stagnation is suggested 
by a slow growth over a long time but this slow growth is just a part of the 
hyperbolic growth, which is convincingly identified using reciprocal values. 
Hyperbolic distributions create also the illusion of a sudden takeoff but this feature 
is also a part of hyperbolic growth.  
Hyperbolic growth is slow over a long time and fast over a short time but the slow 
and fast growth are the integral features of the same monotonically increasing 
distribution, which is easier to understand by using the reciprocal values of the 
growing entity (Nielsen, 2014).   In such displays, the illusion of distinctly different 
components disappears because hyperbolic growth is then represented by a 
decreasing straight line, which is easy to understand. It then becomes obvious that 
hyperbolic distribution cannot be divided into distinctly different sections governed 
by different mechanism because it makes no sense to divide a straight line into 
arbitrarily chosen sections and claim different mechanism for such arbitrarily-
selected section. It is also then clear that it is impossible to determine the transition 
from a slow to a fast growth. Which point on a straight line should we select to 
identify such a transition? The transition does not happen at any specific time but 
gradually over the whole range of time.  
Our analysis shows that the Industrial Revolution had no impact on the growth of 
human population. It also shows that the postulated takeoffs (Galor, 2005, 2008a, 
2011, 2012a) never happened. We have shown earlier (Nielsen, 2016d) that there 
were no takeoffs in the growth of the GDP, global or regional. The demonstrated 
now absence of takeoffs in the growth of population shows that the claimed by 
Galor takeoffs in the income per capita (GDP/cap) did not exist.  
Galor describes the imaginary and non-existing features, which have nothing to do 
with the economic growth or with the growth of human population, features which 
were conjured from such inaccurate displays as shown in Figure 1, interpretations 
based on impressions, which were never checked by the scientific analysis of data. 
It is a world of fiction. All his explanations of the mechanism of economic growth 
based on these and other imaginary features are not only irrelevant but also 
misleading.  
Galor’s Unified Growth Theory is fundamentally incorrect and is repeatedly 
contradicted by data (Nielsen, 2014, 2015a, 2016a, 2016b, 2016d), ironically by 
the same data, which were used but never analysed during the formulation of this 
theory. The evidence contradicting the fundamental postulates of the Unfired 
Growth Theory is overwhelming and further evidence will be presented in the 
forthcoming publications. This evidence questions not only the fundamental 
postulates of the Unified Growth Theory but also many similar postulates used 
traditionally in economic and demographic research, postulates which were based 
largely on impressions and conjectures but postulates, which are now repeatedly 
contradicted by the analysis of Maddison’s data (Maddison, 2001, 2010).  
In science, just one contradicting evidence in data is sufficient to show that 
incorrect postulates should be rejected and that theories based on such postulates 
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should be revised. In its present form, the Unified Growth Theory is scientifically 
unacceptable and so are also many traditional interpretations of the historical 
economic growth and of the growth of human population.   
The data and their analysis suggest new lines of research. They suggest that our 
attention should not be directed towards explaining the mechanism of stagnation 
and of the sudden takeoffs from stagnation to growth because these features are 
contradicted by data. What needs to be explained is why the historical economic 
growth and the growth of human population were hyperbolic and why relatively 
recently they were diverted to slower trajectories. 
The correct understanding of the fundamental concepts of economic growth and of 
the growth of human population is important not only academically but also for 
practical reasons because the correct understanding of the past growth may help us 
to understand the current growth and how it should be controlled. For instance, the 
study of the past growth leads to the conclusion that the spontaneous economic 
growth and the growth of population were hyperbolic. It is, therefore, possible that 
the spontaneous future growth might again become hyperbolic, which would be 
most undesirable because such a growth contains singularity.  
The current economic growth and the growth of population is no longer hyperbolic 
but it still follows closely the historically-determined hyperbolic trajectories and 
thus if left alone it might easily converge into spontaneously-preferable hyperbolic 
distributions.  If we could explain the mechanism of the spontaneous hyperbolic 
growth we might be better equipped to control the future growth.  
The concept of the ages-long stagnation in the economic growth and in the growth 
of human population, generally accepted in the economic and demographic 
research, is potentially dangerous because it diverts our attention from the correct 
understanding of the dynamics of economic growth and of the growth of 
population and thus makes us ill-equipped for finding suitable solutions for 
controlling the future economic growth and of the growth of population.  
In this respect, Unified Growth Theory is unacceptable not only scientifically but 
also for practical reasons. It claims erroneously that after the ages-long stagnation 
in the economic growth we have now entered a sustained-growth regime. This 
concept suggests a prosperous and secure future. However, mathematical analysis 
of data indicates that the economic growth in the past was stable and sustainable 
(Nielsen, 2016a) but now its future is no longer secure (Nielsen, 2015b). The sense 
of security created by the scientifically-unacceptable Unified Growth Theory is 
replaced by the urgent need to control and regulate economic growth. In one of our 
future publications we shall also explain why the concept of the great divergence 
promoted by the Unified Growth Theory is also potentially dangerous.  
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Appendix 
 
The typical distorted presentation of data used repeatedly in the Unified Growth Theory 
(Galor, 2005a, 2011) and in other related publications 
 
Figure 1. Example of the ubiquitous, grossly-distorted and self-misleading diagrams used to create 
the Unified Growth Theory (Galor, 2005a, 2011). Madison’s data (Maddison, 2001) were used during 
the formulation of this theory but they were never analysed. Such state-of-the-art was used to 
construct a system of scientifically-unsupported concepts, interpretations and explanations. 
 
  
The accurate presentation of the same data (Maddison, 2001) and results of their mathematical 
analysis 
 
 
Figure 2. The same data (Maddison, 2001) as used in Figure 1 displayed accurately and analysed. 
They follow monotonically-increasing distributions, which cannot be divided into distinctively-
different components (Nielsen, 2014, 2015a). 
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World Population 
 
Figure 3. Reciprocal values of the world population data (Maddison, 2010) identify uniquely 
hyperbolic distribution between AD 1000 and around 1950 because they follow a decreasing straight 
line. From around 1950, the growth of the population started to be diverted to a new trajectory. 
Industrial Revolution had no impact on changing the growth trajectory. There were also no takeoffs 
from stagnation to growth around the postulated times for developed and less-developed regions 
(Galor, 2008a, 2012a). This analysis and the absence of takeoffs in the GDP distribution (Nielsen, 
2016d) show that there were no takeoffs in the income per capita (GDP/cap) distribution. Unified 
Growth Theory is contradicted yet again by the same data which were used but not analysed during 
the formulation of this theory. 
 
 
Figure 4. Growth of the world population. Data of Maddison (2010) are compared with hyperbolic 
distribution. The point at AD 1 is 75% higher than the fitted curve because there was a maximum in 
the growth of the world population around that time (Nielsen, 2016c).  Industrial Revolution had no 
impact on the growth of the population. There were no takeoffs from stagnation to growth around the 
postulated times (Galor, 2008a, 2012a) for developed and less-developed countries. This analysis and 
the absence of takeoffs in the GDP distribution (Nielsen, 2016d) show that there were no takeoffs in 
the income per capita (GDP/cap) distribution. Unified Growth Theory is contradicted yet again by the 
same data which were used but not analysed during the formulation of this theory.   
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Western Europe 
 
 
Figure 5. Reciprocal values of population data for Western Europe (Maddison, 2010) identify 
uniquely hyperbolic distribution between AD 1000 and around 1915 because they follow a decreasing 
straight line. From around 1915, the growth of the population started to be diverted to a slower 
trajectory. Industrial Revolution had no impact on changing the growth trajectory in the region where 
its influence should have been most pronounced. There was also no takeoff from stagnation to growth 
around the postulated time (Galor, 2008a, 2012a). This analysis and the absence of the takeoff in the 
GDP distribution (Nielsen, 2016d) show that there was no takeoff in the income per capita (GDP/cap) 
distribution. Unified Growth Theory is contradicted yet again by the same data which were used but 
not analysed during the formulation of this theory. 
 
 
Figure 6. Growth of human population in Western Europe. Data of Maddison (2010) are compared 
with hyperbolic distribution.  The point at AD 1 is 89% higher than the fitted curve. This discrepancy 
might be reflecting the maximum in the growth of the world population (Nielsen, 2016c). Industrial 
Revolution had no impact on the growth of the population in Western Europe where the effects of this 
revolution should have been most prominent. There was no takeoff from stagnation to growth around 
the postulated time (Galor, 2008a, 2012a). This analysis and the absence of the takeoff in the GDP 
distribution (Nielsen, 2016d) show that there was no takeoff in the income per capita (GDP/cap) 
distribution. Unified Growth Theory is contradicted yet again by the same data which were used but 
not analysed during the formulation of this theory.  
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Eastern Europe 
 
Figure 7. Reciprocal values of population data for Eastern Europe (Maddison, 2010) identify 
uniquely hyperbolic distribution between AD 1000 and around 1935 because they follow a decreasing 
straight line. From around 1935, hyperbolic growth started to be diverted to a slower trajectory. 
Industrial Revolution had no impact on changing the growth trajectory in Eastern Europe. There was 
also no takeoff from stagnation to growth around the postulated time (Galor, 2008a, 2012a). This 
analysis and the absence of the takeoff in the GDP distribution (Nielsen, 2016d) show that there was 
no takeoff in the income per capita (GDP/cap) distribution. Unified Growth Theory is contradicted 
yet again by the same data which were used but not analysed during the formulation of this theory. 
 
Figure 8. Growth of human population in Eastern Europe. Data of Maddison (2010) are compared 
with hyperbolic distribution.  The point at AD 1 is 45% higher than the fitted curve. This discrepancy 
might be reflecting the maximum in the growth of the world population (Nielsen, 2016c) around that 
time. Industrial Revolution had no impact on the growth of population in Eastern Europe. There was 
no takeoff from stagnation to growth around the postulated time (Galor, 2008a, 2012a). This analysis 
and the absence of the takeoff in the GDP distribution (Nielsen, 2016d) show that there was no 
takeoff in the income per capita (GDP/cap) distribution. Unified Growth Theory is contradicted yet 
again by the same data which were used but not analysed during the formulation of this theory. 
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Former USSR  
 
Figure 9. Reciprocal values of population data for the former USSR (Maddison, 2010) identify 
uniquely hyperbolic distribution between AD 1 and 1920 because they follow closely the decreasing 
straight line. From around 1920 the growth started to be diverted to a slower trajectory. Industrial 
Revolution had no impact on changing the growth trajectory. There was also no takeoff from 
stagnation to growth around the postulated time (Galor, 2008a, 2012a) or around any other time 
because there was no stagnation. There was even no transition to a faster hyperbolic growth. This 
analysis and the absence of the takeoff in the GDP distribution (Nielsen, 2016d) show that there was 
no takeoff in the income per capita (GDP/cap) distribution. Unified Growth Theory is contradicted yet 
again by the same data which were used but not analysed during the formulation of this theory. 
 
 
Figure 10. Growth of human population in the countries of the former USSR. Data of Maddison 
(2010) are compared with the hyperbolic distribution.  Industrial Revolution had no impact on the 
growth of the population. There was no takeoff from stagnation to growth around the postulated time 
(Galor, 2008a, 2012a) or around any other time because there was no stagnation. This analysis and 
the absence of the takeoff in the GDP distribution (Nielsen, 2016d) show that there was no takeoff in 
the income per capita (GDP/cap) distribution. Unified Growth Theory is contradicted yet again by the 
same data which were used but not analysed during the formulation of this theory. 
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Asia (including Japan) 
 
Figure 11. Reciprocal values of population data for Asia (Maddison, 2010) identify uniquely 
hyperbolic distribution between AD 1 and 1920 because they follow closely the decreasing straight 
line. From around 1920, the growth started to be diverted to a temporary faster trajectory. There was 
no takeoff from stagnation to growth around the postulated time (Galor, 2008a,  2012a) because there 
was no stagnation. The temporary boosting around 1920 appears to be a part of the commonly 
observed transition from the historical hyperbolic growth to a slower trajectory. This analysis and the 
absence of the takeoff in the GDP distribution (Nielsen, 2016d) show that there was no takeoff in the 
income per capita (GDP/cap) distribution. Unified Growth Theory is contradicted yet again by the 
same data which were used but not analysed during the formulation of this theory. 
 
 
 
Figure 12. Growth of human population in Asia. Data of Maddison (2010) are compared with the 
hyperbolic distribution.  There was no stagnation but a hyperbolic growth between at least AD 1000 
and 1920. The size of the population at AD 1 is 80% higher than the fitted hyperbolic distribution, 
reflecting probably the maximum in the growth of the world population around that year (Nielsen, 
2016c).  There was no takeoff from stagnation to growth around the postulated time (Galor, 2008a, 
2012a) because there was no stagnation before the temporary boosting from around 1920. This 
analysis and the absence of the takeoff in the GDP distribution (Nielsen, 2016d) show that there was 
no takeoff in the income per capita (GDP/cap) distribution. Unified Growth Theory is contradicted yet 
again by the same data which were used but not analysed during the formulation of this theory. 
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Figure 13. Reciprocal values of the population data for Africa (Maddison, 2010) identify uniquely two 
hyperbolic distributions: AD 1-1840 and AD 1840-1980 because they follow closely the decreasing 
straight lines. From around 1980 the growth started to be diverted to a slower trajectory. There was 
no takeoff from stagnation to growth around the postulated time (Galor, 2008a, 2012a) because there 
was no stagnation. However there was a transition around AD 1840 from a slow to a fast hyperbolic 
trajectory. This analysis and the absence of the takeoff in the GDP distribution (Nielsen, 2016d) show 
that there was no takeoff in the income per capita (GDP/cap) distribution. Unified Growth Theory is 
contradicted yet again by the same data which were used but not analysed during the formulation of 
this theory. 
 
 
Figure 14. Growth of human population in Africa. Data of Maddison (2010) are compared with two 
hyperbolic distributions, AD 1-1840 and AD 1840-1980.  There was no stagnation but a hyperbolic 
growth. There was no takeoff from stagnation to growth around the postulated time (Galor, 2008a, 
2012a) because there was no stagnation. The fast hyperbolic growth, continued undisturbed until 
1980 when it started to be diverted to a slower trajectory. Around 1840, there was a transition from a 
slow to a fast hyperbolic trajectory. This analysis and the absence of the takeoff in the GDP 
distribution (Nielsen, 2016d) show that there was no takeoff in the income per capita (GDP/cap) 
distribution. Unified Growth Theory is contradicted yet again by the same data which were used but 
not analysed during the formulation of this theory. 
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Latin America 
 
 
Figure 15. Reciprocal values of the population data for Latin America (Maddison, 2010) identify two 
hyperbolic distributions: AD 1-1500 and AD 1600-1900 because they follow closely the decreasing 
straight lines. From around 1900 the growth started to be diverted to a slower trajectory. There was 
no takeoff from stagnation to growth around the postulated time (Galor, 2008a, 2012a) but there was 
a transition around the postulated takeoff to a slower trajectory. Data replace Galor’s takeoff by a 
transition to a slower trajectory. This analysis and the absence of the takeoff in the GDP distribution 
(Nielsen, 2016d) show that there was no takeoff in the income per capita (GDP/cap) distribution. 
Unified Growth Theory is contradicted yet again by the same data which were used but not analysed 
during the formulation of this theory. 
 
 
Figure 16. Growth of human population in Latin America. Data of Maddison (2010) are compared 
with two hyperbolic distributions, AD 1-1500 and AD 1600-1900.  There was no stagnation but a 
hyperbolic growth. There was no takeoff from stagnation to growth around the postulated time (Galor, 
2008a, 2012a) because there was no stagnation. The fast hyperbolic growth continued undisturbed 
until 1900 when it started to be diverted to a slower trajectory. Data replace Galor’s takeoff by a 
transition to a slower trajectory. This analysis and the absence of the takeoff in the GDP distribution 
(Nielsen, 2016d) show that there was no takeoff in the income per capita (GDP/cap) distribution. 
Unified Growth Theory is contradicted yet again by the same data which were used but not analysed 
during the formulation of this theory. 
 
 
 
 
 
